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The present crisis has revealed that, as expected, much of the safety net for 
handling failures in the banking system is deficient, particularly for cross-border 
banks, and the present problems had to be handled by a range of ad hoc measures. 
The principal new measure that needs to be undertaken in most countries is the 
implementation of a satisfactory special resolution regime for banks. This paper, 
however, deals with two further steps that could assist the operation of the safety 
net. The first is to ensure earlier intervention so there is more time to put a 
satisfactory rescue or resolution in place. The second is to implement a regime of 
prompt corrective action (structured early intervention and resolution, SEIR) so 
that both supervisors and banks know that a regime of increasing intensity will 
take place according to a strict timetable that will end in the authorities stepping 
into the bank while it still has positive capital, if the earlier stages are not 
effective. The paper evaluates the means of doing this in a European environment 
making use of the experience in the United States. It concludes that, while a lot 
can be done even within the current framework of national supervision, 
particularly through pre-positioning, cross-border banks can be better treated 
either by revising the home-host responsibilities or by moving to a supranational 
level of responsibility for SEIR for those banks whose continued operation is 
considered necessary for financial stability in any member state. 
 
Keywords: early intervention, prompt corrective action, cross-border banks, pre-
positioning, bank resolution 
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Varhainen väliintulo ja korjaavat toimenpiteet 
pankkien valvonnassa Euroopassa 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 17/2009 
David G. Mayes 




Nykyinen kriisi on paljastanut – kuten saatettiin odottaa – että pankkien ongel-
mien hoitamiseen tarkoitetut turvajärjestelyt ovat suurelta osin puutteelliset. Tämä 
pätee etenkin yli rajojen eli useassa maassa toimiviin pankkeihin. Nyt ongelmat 
on jouduttu hoitamaan erilaisin tilapäistoimenpitein. Tärkein uusi keino, joka 
tarvitaan useimmissa maissa, on jokin tyydyttävä tapa ongelmiin joutuneen pankin 
järjestelemiseksi uudelleen. Tässä keskustelualoitteessa käsitellään kahta lisätoi-
menpidettä, jotka voivat parantaa turvajärjestelyjen toimivuutta. Niistä ensimmäi-
sen on tarkoitus taata varhaisempi asioihin puuttuminen, jotta tyydyttävän pelas-
tusoperaation tai uudelleenjärjestelyn toteuttamiseksi jää riittävästi aikaa. Toiseksi 
tulisi luoda korjaavien toimenpiteiden järjestelmä (structured early intervention 
and resolution, SEIR), jossa niin pankit kuin valvojatkin tietävät, että pankit joutu-
vat tarvittaessa tiukentuvien toimenpiteiden kohteeksi. Nämä voivat viime kädes-
sä johtaa siihen, että pankki joutuu valvojan ohjaukseen. Tämä on tarkoitus toteut-
taa siinä vaiheessa, kun pankissa on vielä riittävästi jäljellä omia pääomia, elleivät 
aikaisemmat valvontatoimenpiteet ole johtaneet toivottuun tulokseen. Tässä kes-
kustelualoitteessa arvioidaan keinoja toteuttaa tällainen järjestelmä Euroopassa. 
Arvioinnissa käytetään hyväksi Yhdysvaltojen vastaavia kokemuksia. Päätelmänä 
todetaan, että paljon on tehtävissä jo nykyisen kansallisen sääntelyn puitteissa eri-
tyisesti valmiusjärjestelyjen (ns. pre-positioning) avulla. Yli maiden rajojen toimi-
vien pankkien tapauksessa järjestelmä toimisi kuitenkin paremmin, jos koti- ja 
isäntämaan valvojien vastuunjakoa uudistettaisiin. Toinen vaihtoehto olisi, että 
vastuu yli maiden rajojen toimivien pankkien SEIR-järjestelmästä olisi ylikansal-
lisella taholla. Tämä koskisi niitä pankkeja, joiden toiminnan jatkuvuuden turvaa-
minen olisi rahoitusjärjestelmän vakauden kannalta välttämätöntä missä tahansa 
jäsenmaassa, jossa näillä pankeilla on toimintaa. 
 
Avainsanat: varhainen väliintulo, korjaavat toimenpiteet, maiden rajat ylittävä 
pankkitoiminta, valmiusjärjestelyt 
 
JEL-luokittelu: G21, G28, G33, F15, F23, E58  
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The recent crisis has taught us (at least) five main lessons, all of which were 
known beforehand but not appreciated so graphically: 
 
1.  Banks can get into trouble extremely rapidly – the authorities therefore need 
to have extensive ‘pre-positioning’ if they are to handle the difficulty 
efficiently 
2.  Depositors need to be guaranteed almost uninterrupted access to their funds 
and full insurance of most deposits if bank runs are to be avoided 
3.  The whole system of prompt corrective action (PCA) needs to start early, 
before the capital triggers are reached and hence requires a basis in risk 
assessment and market signals 
4.  It is necessary to be able to step into a bank and take it over before its capital 
is entirely depleted 
5.  If these were not enough, acting on cross-border banks is much more difficult 
as the tools and responsibilities are national, hence the chances of a disorderly 
failure are much greater. 
 
It is easy to extend the list: it is clear that the market for troubled banks is highly 
imperfect – no reasonable bids could be obtained for Northern Rock and the 
rescue of Bear Stearns involved the commitment of substantial public funding, as 
did that of Roskilde in Denmark. Public funding of the banking system has had to 
be extended on a scale not previously thought of in a bid to stop systemic 
collapse. Financial stability involves more than a narrow interpretation of banks, 
with the perceived need to support not just investment banks but Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac and the insurer AIG. The existing regulatory system has been shown 
up as being even more procyclical than had been feared. There has been serious 
mispricing of risk and even more serious underestimation of the importance of 
liquidity. 
  The major problems largely occurred in ‘national’ banks yet the authorities 
had problems coping. When they reached cross-border banks the authorities often 
could not manage unless the home country was to assume responsibility and get 
on with the job and their interests were in line with those of the other countries 
involved
1 or where the bank could be readily split into its national components as 
in the case of Dexia and Fortis. In the case of Lehman Brothers it was a case of 
‘too complex to save’ (Herring, 2002). Neither the authorities nor the private 
sector could put together a rescue plan fast enough because of the difficulty of 
assessing the potential losses, assisted by the natural reluctance of the existing 
                                                 
1 This fortunately appears to be the case in AIG, where many counterparties lie outside the US.  
8 
management to accept a low value deal. In the case of the three main Icelandic 
banks it was a case of ‘too big to save’, a problem clearly identified by Sigurðsson 
(2003) inter alia well before the event. Where a bank is too large relative to its 
home country the authorities cannot afford either rescue or the payout of all 
insured depositors. Since this had been clearly recognized and put into the 
legislative framework by the Swiss authorities (Hüpkes, 2003) it is strange that 
this untenable situation could persist elsewhere. It presumably reflects the belief 
that whatever is said such banks cannot fail.
2 
  In the Nordic environment the main lesson from this experience is that if a 
similar problem is to be avoided with any of the larger cross-border banks, the 
individual authorities need to have similar powers and compulsions and be able to 
take into account problems in the rest of the financial group when taking action. 
More widely in Europe the problem is more complex as the regulatory systems in 
the different countries are less similar. However, large cross-border banks are not 
simply European and having to co-ordinate more widely, particularly with the 
United States, widens the problem still further.
3 There are already many 
suggestions available for future action. That by the de Larosière Group (2009) set 
up by the European Commission is likely to be among the more influential but it 
does not address the hardest issues directly of how authorities can manage to act 
promptly together in their joint interest nor how joint resolution of groups that are 
not readily divisible could be organized. It identifies the problem (para 201)
4 but 
focuses on the easier issues of how euro area level macro-prudential monitoring 
can be organized, how regulatory harmonization can be accelerated and cross-
border disputes resolved (outside crises) – all worthwhile steps of course. 
  This is a huge agenda even at a national level. If experience elsewhere is 
anything to go by, say from the United States, it could easily take six years or so 
to implement the changes needed after the decision to go ahead is made. Taking 
the decisions themselves is a different issue. On the whole it is easier to take them 
                                                 
2 Given the willingness that authorities have shown for rescuing national banks in the present crisis 
this is a belief that is clearly generally justified. Much of the major impact of the failure of 
Lehman Brothers was because it was unexpected despite its problems. Given the saving of Bear 
Stearns many investors could be forgiven for expecting a similar rescue despite any prior 
assertions to the contrary. 
3 In the event of a cross-border failure disputes among the different jurisdictions, trying to protect 
their own stakeholders is inevitable. The dispute over the location of assets within a week of the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers as those trying to realize parts of the group as going concerns sought 
to get rapid deals (Financial Times 20/21 September, p. 1) was a good illustration. 
4 Paragraph 201 reads: ‘The EU framework for crisis management and resolution should be 
modified to deal with a large cross-border bank in difficulty, while preserving financial stability, 
ensuring the continuity of key banking services and minimizing the costs of a resolution to the 
public. Because of different supervisory and crisis resolution tools, and entity-specific insolvency 
and company law environments, this is not the case currently. National authorities are left with no 
alternatives other than to use public money or ring fence assets in a cross-border bank and apply 
national resolution tools at entity level. …. Legislative changes covering in particular aspects of 
company and insolvency laws (eg winding up, transferability of assets, bankruptcy), should be 
proposed by the Commission as soon as possible… ’  
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quickly while the problems are obvious and decision makers are still concerned by 
the problems they found themselves in.
5 Postponing until there is adequate time 
for reflection can mean that the issue goes right down the order of priority and the 
political window of opportunity is lost. On the other hand rapid legislation can 
sometimes offer new problems of its own. The well-intentioned Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act in the US is now appearing to pose a number of difficulties. It is not clear 
whether a revised Act will ultimately prove the best solution or whether the initial 
legislation should have been allowed more time to mature. For either to be 
effective depends on the particular political environment at the time. Nevertheless 
in the aftermath of the difficulties that have assailed the world there is now an 
opportunity for change before the problem strikes – waiting until the next crisis 
happens with cross-border banks and the extra losses are incurred because 
systems have not been adequately revised would be, to use the word of Padoa-
Schioppa (2007), ‘irresponsible’. 
  This paper sets out some suggestions about helpful changes that could be 
made in the current environment but it also admits that some of the changes 
required entail a very fundamental review of how cross-border problems should 
be tackled, particularly within Europe. The focus is on how problems in banks can 
be identified early and dealt with quickly. 
 
 
2 A  preliminary  remark 
Outside the United States and the transition countries, the financial safety net had 
been largely untested. It could cope with small problems such as failures of fringe 
banks but its ability to handle larger problems has in many cases been only 
theoretical despite simulation exercises. In most respects this is exactly as it 
should be. It is widely hoped that the safety net will not be used. The net performs 
two main functions: 
 
1.  It acts as a reassurance to depositors and other creditors (and indeed to 
borrowers) that any problem could be successfully addressed. 
2.  It acts as an incentive to the private sector to find solutions well in advance 
because the public sector is not going to provide a bail out. The public sector 
solution will wipe out the shareholders, managers can expect to lose their jobs 
and junior debtors may well face losses. 
 
                                                 
5 The UK has managed to push legislation through Parliament in around 18 months following a 
really strong incentive and with a clear governmental majority in the legislature. This is rapid by 
any standards, although temporary summary legislation was passed in just a few days to enable the 
nationalization of Northern Rock. Other countries will typically expect to take longer.  
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Thus the intention on the one hand is to provide confidence to the public and on 
the other to try to ensure that the private sector solves its own problems. PCA in 
particular needs to have a sequence of increasingly harsh intervention according 
to timetable as the problem worsens, so that banks will have little incentive to 
delay and the authorities will find it difficult to forebear unduly. This process 
needs to start as early as possible, as exit will be very rapid if confidence is lost. 
  It is probably the UK that has received the greatest lesson in reality, although 
of course in relative terms the impact on Iceland has been far larger.
6 What we 
have seen from the Northern Rock episode in the UK is that these conditions for 
an effective safety net did not apply. Action was late and there was a bank run. 
However, the problem was resolved without any overall financial instability in 
that emergency lending was provided under normal terms and the bank was 
nationalized while shareholder value was positive, avoiding both direct and 
indirect contagion of the problem to other financial institutions. Nevertheless, this 
was not the authorities preferred method of resolution and a comprehensive 
review of the safety net and how it should operate ensued. PCA forms part of that 
new approach. The House of Commons Treasury Committee (2008) concluded 
‘We see great merit in the “prompt corrective action” approach adopted in the 
United States and other countries.’ (p. 12). The Roskilde case on Denmark has 
similar characteristics.
7 Although the problems were identified and normal 
collateralized emergency lending provided by Danmarks Nationalbank on July 10, 
2007, no scheme for providing recapitalization emerged and by 24 August the 
bank was judged to be insolvent and was swiftly resolved leaving the impaired 
assets and the claims of the shareholders and junior creditors in the old ‘closed’ 
bank and transferring the good assets, depositors and senior debtors to a new bank 
recapitalized by a combination of the central bank and a private sector 
consortium. There are some unusual characteristics of Danish Law that permitted 
this solution, while the UK had to introduce special legislation to resolve Northern 
Rock. Whether other countries could manage the same is more debatable. 
  The corner stone of the new arrangements in the UK has been the Special 
Resolution Regime. After the experience with Northern Rock the UK authorities 
were able to tackle the next most exposed institution, Bradford and Bingley, and 
resolve it in a timely and relatively low cost manner with the benefit of 2–3 
months preparation.
8 (The perceived need to take a controlling share in Lloyds-
                                                 
6 Of course the problem has been largest in the United States and, as discussed below, the major 
question there has been not so much whether the banking safety net works but how far it should be 
extended to other institutions, particularly investment banks and insurance companies. There have 
of course also been major lessons for supervisors but that is only part of the focus of the present 
article. 
7 Roskilde was Denmarks’s sixth largest bank. 
8 This was done under the summary legislation passed to permit the nationalization of Northern 
Rock and not the new Banking Act of 2009, although this has now been used for the case of the 
Dunfermline Building Society.  
11 
HBOS and the Royal Bank of Scotland reflects that it has still not proved possible 
to let the largest institutions fail and be resolved without causing a crisis – typical 
cases of ‘too big to fail’ (Stern and Feldman, 2004).) 
 
 
3  The task ahead for Europe 
The problems in the UK prompted the authorities to embark on a wholesale 
reform of the safety net, revising deposit insurance, instituting a special resolution 
regime, ensuring earlier action and reorganizing the structure of responsibility to 
give a leading role to the central bank. The question at issue is what should be 
done more broadly in Europe, particularly for financial institutions whose 
activities run across borders? Even within the UK there was some debate over 
whether all such change was necessary and whether it should all be attempted at 
the same time. After all, there was no financial disaster in the direct sense when 
Northern Rock had to be rescued. Creditors and depositors lost nothing. While the 
public sector on behalf of the taxpayer has taken on some considerable contingent 
liabilities these may not all be realized and some of the assets may be disposed of 
at a profit. The losers have been the shareholders and to some extent the 
management that took the decisions that got them into the difficulty.
9 Tackling the 
economic recession that has followed is a different issue as is the widening of the 
financial crisis after the failure of Lehman Brothers. Here there have been 
widespread losses and the taxpayer in particular can expect to pay perhaps for as 
long as a generation. However, unless even the gloomiest forecasts are badly 
astray, people are not expecting costs on the scale of, say, the Finnish crisis of the 
early 1990s. Similarly deficiencies in supervision and macroprudential analysis in 
the run up to the crisis may have been very costly but the safety net per se, with 
the benefit of rapid adjustment has largely held. 
  In many respects the need for action is driven by moral hazard. If the state has 
been prepared to step in in this way on this occasion then it can be expected to do 
the same in the future. This may exacerbate the under-pricing of risk and 
encourage excessive risk-taking in the future. A more prosaic reason for action is 
that the political windows for such change tend not to be open for long. Sweden, 
for example, has had a proposal for extensive regulatory reform ready for 
submission to parliament for over 7 years but the risks were not felt large enough 
to move it up the legislative programme. Now, having had their own difficulties in 
trying to close a failed but fortunately very small bank and observing the 
problems of others the picture is changing and it appears that they are now 
proposing to introduce legislation that has a lot in common with the UK 
                                                 
9 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may be in the same position.  
12 
proposals.
10 If the process of change is embarked upon now it could be in place by 
the time of the next crisis. 
  However, unlike the UK, many smaller European countries, such as, Estonia 
and Finland do not have largely national banks; their banks are largely cross-
border, headquartered in other member states (see Figure 3.1 for a picture of the 
position across the EU). Unilateral action might be either confusing or ineffective. 
Indeed attempts to put greater constraints on banks than in partner countries might 
simply drive the rest of the banking system into other jurisdictions. Hence any 
programme of change needs to have two features built into it: first that it is 
consistent with what exists or is planned in the rest of the Nordic region; second, 
that it gives a positive incentive to the banks to adopt it. Elsewhere in Europe the 
problems may be more difficult as the differences between financial regulatory 
systems are greater and the history of joint activity much shorter. 
 
Figure 3.1  Cross-border integration of the banking sector, 







*) Cross-border Index = 
outward integration + 
inward integration
Outward integration = 
The share of domestic 
banks’ total assets held 
in EU25 countries 
outside the home 
country
Inward integration = 




Source: Persson (2009) 
 
 
This issue of an incentive is a potential way to deal with one large problem facing 
a special resolution regime for banks. Currently, as a result of the Pafitis case, it 
may well be difficult to impose one on banks for fear of violating the human 
rights of shareholders, although the Roskilde example in Denmark suggests that 
                                                 
10 Dagens Industri, 11th September 2008.  
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there may be ways round this.
11 In the UK it is suggested that shareholders might 
agree to this in return for improved deposit insurance and improved emergency 
lending facilities.
12 This again argues for a package approach to change if the 
benefits are dispensed before the costs the banks may be able to lobby 
successfully against the imposition of the costs. Nevertheless, under the great 
pressure of the last six months shareholders in most of the main commercial banks 
in the UK have been prepared to accept a considerable dilution of their rights in 
return for major investments by the government – sufficient in the case of RBS to 
make it the majority owner and in the case of Lloyds-HBOS to exercise a 
considerable influence. Only Barclays has avoided such an influence at the cost of 
allowing a major new private sector capital injection. Thus a crisis seems to have 
overridden these legal objections. 
  One immediate lesson that can be learnt from the UK is that many countries’ 
systems of deposit insurance would not be credible in the face of the possible 
failure of a non-trivial bank. The deposit insurer does not have the capability to 
provide virtually uninterrupted access to deposits. This could be changed at 
relatively limited cost. Also it might be worth considering a general rise in 
coverage so that 100% of most people’s deposits are covered. Prospects for 
change in the EU now seem greater as the Commission has reopened the issue 
although the recent review of the Deposit Insurance Directive led to no 
substantive change. However most of the changes needed for national banks could 
be implemented unilaterally as the Directive does not impose upward 
improvements simply minimum standards. 
  The most serious lesson has come from the failure of the three main Icelandic 
banks, Landsbanki, Glitnir and Kaupthing. This has shown that the European 
approach to cross-border failure and crisis resolution has some major flaws – as 
pointed out well in advance by Mayes and Vesala (2000) inter alia. If any other 
solution than keeping the banking group afloat through the actions of the home 
country supervisor is to be followed then the authorities in other countries need to 
be able to intervene in the entities within their boundaries. Where there are 
subsidiaries that are separable units this may well be possible as was illustrated in 
the cases of Fortis and Dexia, provided that the authorities are jointly willing to 
act in complementary manner. Where there are branches there is no such elegant 
option and closure is likely to be the only viable option unless it is possible to 
                                                 
11 There also appear to be unusual features of the treatment of Tier 2 capital in Denmark, which 
enable rapid resolutions. For debt to be acceptable as Tier 2 capital in Denmark it has to have 
provision for writing down and for deferring interest. Clearly if other countries were to switch to 
this requirement it might increase the cost of subordinated debt slightly but then this position 
effectively applies in the United States, Canada and other countries with a special resolution 
regime already so it is clearly not something prohibitive. 
12 Eisenbeis and Kaufman (2007) have argued along similar lines for the introduction of a special 
regime for cross-border banks; a point I return to later.  
14 
carve out the activities of the branch if they are sufficiently separable given the 
agreement of the home country supervisor. 
  This point is addressed by the 2009 Turner Review in the UK in reaction to 
the adverse experience over the Icelandic banks but without suggesting a clear 
way of resolving the problem.
13 Outside the EU, New Zealand has effectively 
solved the issue by insisting that all significant banks must not merely be 
subsidiaries but subsidiaries that can operate independently within the value day.
14 
No such compulsion can at present be applied in the EU as a result of the 
‘passport principle’ and indeed were it to exist it would have the consequence of 
severely restricting the concept of cross-border banks to something fairly close to 
a holding company with largely autonomous subsidiaries – something that itself 
may have attractions if the Santander Group is anything to go by. Despite its 
extensive proposals the de Larosière Report does not grasp this issue, something I 
return to later. Clearly, cross-border (and other LCFIs) must have a structure such 
that the authorities can handle them swiftly and efficiently without recourse to a 
bail out. In part this can be addressed by changing the structure of banks and the 
market (as argued by Stern and Feldman (2004) inter alia) but also by changing 
the tools and legal framework in which the authorities can operate. 
  However, in this paper I focus on just one aspect of the safety net – Structured 
Early Intervention and Resolution (SEIR), or Prompt Corrective Action as it tends 
to be labeled in the United States – although it only makes sense as part of an 
integrated safety net. The reasons for this focus are simple. 
 
•  SEIR has proved credible in the US. It is readily possible to see how it was 
implemented in practice and there is experience with its drawbacks. Although 
a European version would undoubtedly be different in detail there is a 
working template to follow and such a system would find it relatively easy to 
gain credibility in Europe as well.  
•  It deals with several of the key points of the safety net. It is designed to cut in 
early. It offers strong incentives for the private sector to solve the problems 
first. It gives some certainty as to how problems will be resolved and it makes 
it clear that not only is there a timetable for solution but that should all the 
early stages fail the problem can be brought to a conclusion in a manner that 
will avoid a financial crisis, avoid any bailout of the shareholders, avoid 
exposing the taxpayer to direct losses and leave the creditors better off than 
they would be in a traditional insolvency. 
                                                 
13 The Report calls on p. 102 for debate on the preference for ‘The reinforcement of host country 
supervisory powers over liquidity, and the right of host country supervisors to demand 
subsidiarisation and to impose adequate capital requirements and restrictions on local business 
activity.’ 
14 Outside the EU other countries, such as the US and Canada, have imposed conditions of 
registration even for branches that give the host authorities supervisory rights and the ability to 
intervene in the event of difficulty.  
15 
•  PCA can be introduced in Europe within the current supervisory structures. It 
does not require the creation of a grand European institution nor with one 
exception does it require any extensive new legislation that might be difficult 
to agree across the member states.
15 (The exception is the closure rule.) Its 
existence will make it easier for the present authorities to work together and 
achieve a coordinated solution. 
•  It does not impose any substantial new regulatory burden on banks and 
through harmonization will make it easier for them to operate across borders. 
•  Use of PCA substantial reduces the chance that there will be an awkward 
problem of burden sharing among the countries involved in supervising a 
problem bank 
 
But it is not a panacea. As in the US, operating a complex network of supervisors 
is not the efficient solution for the cross-border institutions that the EU is 
encouraging. It is a pragmatic step forward. Ultimately offering a European level 
regulatory environment for European level financial institutions sounds more 
promising and would reflect the US experience with the Federal Reserve, the 
Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 
 
 
4  A little background on SEIR
16 
SEIR was first laid out by Benston and Kaufman (1988) as a means of minimizing 
deposit insurance losses by requiring a series of mandatory supervisory 
interventions as a bank’s regulatory capital ratio falls.
17 One way that this 
proposal could work is illustrated in Table 4.1 of Benston and Kaufman (1988, 
p. 64), in which they propose that banks be placed in one of four categories or 
tranches: 
 
(1) No  problem, 
(2) Potential problems that would be subject to more intensive supervision and 
regulation, 
(3) Problem intensive that would face even more intensive supervision and 
regulation with mandatory suspension of dividends and 
                                                 
15 It would, however require considerable regulatory convergence at the detailed level but no 
greater than that envisaged in the de Larosière Report, for example. 
16 This section draws heavily on Mayes et al (2008). 
17 See Benston and Kaufman (1988). For a discussion of the intellectual history of PCA see 
Benston and Kaufman (1994).  
16 
(4) Reorganization mandatory, with ownership of these banks automatically 
transferred to the deposit insurer.
18 
 
Table 4.1  The US framework for prompt corrective action 
 
     Capital  ratios 
     Risk-based 
capital 
Leverage
Category Mandatory  provisions  Discretionary provisions  Total  Tier 1  Ratio 
Well capitalized  No capital distribution or payment 
of management fees that would 





          
Adequately 
capitalized 
1. Same as well capitalized    >8%  >4%  >4% 
          
Undercapitalized  1. Capital distributions and 
management fees suspended 
1. Require recapitalization by 
issuing capital or selling to 
another firm 
<8% <4%  4% 
  2. Capital restoration plan  2. Restricting transactions with 
affiliates 
    
  3. Asset growth restricted  3. Restricting rates on new 
deposits 
    
  4. Prior approval for branching, 
acquisitions, and new lines of 
business 
4. Restricting asset growth       
  5. No brokered deposits  5. Restricting activities       
    6. Improving management by 
replacing directors or managers 
    
    7. Prohibit deposits from 
correspondent banks 
    
    8. Requiring prior approval for 
capital distribution by bank 
holding company 
    
    9. Requiring divestiture       
          
Significantly 
undercapitalized 
1. Same as undercapitalized    <6%  <3%  <3% 
  2. At least one of the 9 
discretionary provisions under 
undercapitalized. Presumption in 
favour of (1) (required capital 
issuance only), (2), and (3) 
      
  3. Senior officer compensation 
restricted 
      
          
Critically 
undercapitalized 
1. Any action authorized for 
significantly undercapitalized banks 
     <2%** 
  2. Payments on subordinated debt 
prohibited* 
      
  3. Conservatorship or receivership 
within 90 days* 
      
* Not required if certain conditions are met. 
** Tangible equity only. 




                                                 
18 The US scheme as implemented has 5 zones (as set out in Table 4.1), whereas the UK has 
decided to have only 3 zones ‘green’, ‘amber’ and ‘red’ where the second and third categories in 
the Benston and Kaufman (1988) list are combined (House of Commons Treasury Committee, 
2008, p. 19). The principle is the same but the advantage of having the second and third zones in 
the Benston and Kaufman framework is that they distinguish heightened concern from the definite 
requirement to take action.  
17 
Although the deposit insurer would assume control of the bank, Benston and 
Kaufman (1988, p. 68) ordinarily would have the bank continue in operation 
under the temporary control of the relevant deposit insurer, the FDIC (Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation)
19 or be sold to another bank, with liquidation only 
as a ‘last resort’. The deposit insurer would remain at risk under SEIR, but only to 
the extent of covering losses to insured depositors. However, Benston and 
Kaufman did not expect such a takeover to be necessary, except when a bank’s 
capital was depleted before the supervisors could act, perhaps as a result of a 
massive undetected fraud. Because the bank’s owners would realize that the 
supervisors were mandated to take over a bank while it was solvent (3 per cent 
market value of capital-to-asset ratio under the SEIR proposal), the owners had 
strong incentives to recapitalize, sell, or liquidate the bank rather than put it to the 
FDIC.
20 
  A version of SEIR was adopted under the title prompt corrective action (PCA) 
with the 1991 passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement 
Act (FDICIA) as shown in Table 3. PCA deals with prudential supervisors’ 
agency problem by first allowing and then requiring specific intervention by the 
supervisory authorities on a timely basis. It is worth recalling that FDICIA was 
enacted in the light of the savings and loans problems in the US and reflected 
dissatisfaction with the previous regime. 
  Whereas SEIR sketches out how supervisors would respond to a drop in 
capital adequacy, PCA provides a list of actions the supervisors may take and 
another set of actions the supervisor must take to further the goals of PCA 
(minimizing losses to the deposit insurance fund). While PCA reduces 
supervisory discretion as a bank’s capital level falls, supervisors retain substantial 
discretion over almost all banks. Even the ‘mandatory provisions’ often include a 
significant element of supervisory discretion. For example, while an 
undercapitalized bank must submit a capital restoration plan, the supervisors have 
discretion over whether the plan will be approved as ‘acceptable’. 
  PCA may appear to be simply a set of supervisory corrective measures that 
should be taken as a bank’s capital declines that any country could easily adopt. 
However, PCA is unlikely to work as intended if a country has not accepted 
PCA’s underlying philosophy or lacks the necessary institutional prerequisites. 
There are three important aspects to the philosophy underlying PCA (Nieto and 
Wall, 2006): 
 
                                                 
19 The FDIC covers the normal range of depository institutions but not all of what would be 
labeled ‘banks’ in the EU. 
20 Table 2 in Benston and Kaufman (1998) gives ‘Illustrative Reorganization Rules’ with 
mandatory reorganization at a 3 per cent market value of capital-to-asset ratio. However, the text 
talks about the possibility that this ratio should be revised upwards.  
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(1) bank prudential supervisors’ primary focus should be on protecting the 
deposit insurance fund and minimizing government (taxpayer) losses, 
(2) supervisors should have a clear set of required actions to be taken as a bank 
becomes progressively more undercapitalized and 
(3) undercapitalized banks should be closed before the economic value of their 
capital becomes negative. 
 
The four institutional prerequisites identified by Nieto and Wall (2006) are: 
 
(1)  supervisory independence and accountability; 
(2) adequate  authority, 
(3)  accurate and timely information and 
(4) adequate  resolution  procedures. 
 
They find that European countries currently comply with these institutional 
requirements to varying degrees. The adoption of a version of PCA would provide 
the EU with a set of minimum supervisory responses to violations of the Capital 
Requirement Directive (CRD).
21 However, as the present crisis has revealed these 
interventions are needed in response to other weaknesses in the banks’ prudential 
management well in advance of any threat to required capital ratios. Nevertheless, 
the same principles would need to apply – that early intervention is mandatory 
and that the form of that intervention should become progressively harsh as the 
violation of prudential standards increases.
22 
  The focus on PCA reflects four things. First that the key concern is to deal 
with problems expeditiously. Hence, the focus for harmonization should be on the 
actions that can be taken by the various authorities and on the thresholds that 
trigger them. While considerable harmonization may be required for authorities in 
one jurisdiction to be satisfied that all that is necessary is being done in the others 
to ensure prudent operation in normal times it is not necessary to eradicate all the 
national discrepancies to achieve this. Hence the extent of the pressure on CEBS 
to achieve harmonization can be more limited. Second, the national authorities 
must be capable of taking actions that are in the interests of the other countries 
involved in a cross-border banking group and not just their own. This is a very 
substantial requirement. It may be necessary to impose constraints on a healthy 
                                                 
21 Directive 2006/49/EC of the European parliament and of the Council of 14 June, 2006 on the 
capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions (recast). Official Journal of the 
European Union L177/201 30 June, 2006. 
22 The UK has provided another example in March 2009, with the failure of the Dunfermline 
Building Society. Here lending to the commercial property sector and the purchase of asset backed 
securities from US financial institutions showed both a growth and an extent that should have been 
a concern in 2007 but no strong action was taken. With the benefit of hindsight it is difficult to 
understand how either the management or the supervisors could have talked themselves into 
permitting the build up of such risks.  
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subsidiary in one country in order to assist a troubled subsidiary in another 
country, where it otherwise threatens to cause financial instability in that country. 
Nieto and Wall’s last two requirements most certainly apply – information – both 
for the different supervisors to be able to compile an adequate picture of a cross-
border bank and for a national supervisor to be able to assess the financial stability 
in his country where many of the banks are cross border – and adequate resolution 
procedures for handling cross-border banks. However, this later is the subject of a 
different paper and a subject I have considered before (Mayes et al, 2001 and 
Mayes and Liuksila, 2003, for example). 
 
 
5  A problem of triggers 
Table 4.1 sets out the rules of the US version of PCA in a simplified form. It is 
clear that this is based purely on a set of capital triggers. However, as Peek and 
Rosengren (1997) point out, even in the US intervention has tended to occur 
before the capital triggers are breached. It is information obtained in part of the 
normal regular assessment and in the compilation of CAMELS ratings that 
triggers the move from the first category. Really it is the categorization by 
Benston and Kaufman (1988) that is the more descriptive. The first category for 
PCA should be the onset of suspicion that something is wrong. Apparently in 
practice the move out of the well capitalized category into adequately capitalized 
is done on this basis by the FDIC (Lane, 2008). 
  As I suggested right at the outset, the one of the main lessons we have relearnt 
in the current crisis is the need to act very early. The literature on early warning 
indicators (see Davis and Dilruba, 2008, for example) is quite well developed. We 
have a fairly good idea of the sorts of macroeconomic indicators that will tell us 
something about the general economic cycle and CAMELS style sets of indicators 
for the individual institution seems to work reasonably well.
23 The problem 
normally is that the indications are only completely clear with the benefit of 
hindsight. Some banks will evade detection, while others will trigger closer 
investigation unnecessarily. This is a standard Type I and Type II error problem 
and deciding on the particular dividing line will depend on the preferences for 
making the two types of mistake. 
  In implementing PCA in a European environment it would be more helpful to 
acknowledge other triggers that will cut in earlier than capital triggers explicitly. 
The most useful additional triggers would be related to the existing supervisory 
process. For example, both the risk assessment under Pillar 2 of Basel 2 and the 
disclosures under Pillar 3 are of value. Of course one other feature of the present 
                                                 
23 Most supervisors use a similar range of indicators although they will vary in the detail and may 
not use the same classification as the US.  
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crisis has been that supervisors and the banks themselves have recognized rapidly 
that many of their stress-testing procedures are inadequate. When these are refined 
then detection should be somewhat easier. Pillar 3 disclosures give a better 
opportunity for market discipline to operate. Poor performance is likely to be 
reflected in the share price and substantial falls in short periods of time should 
trigger action. A glance at Figure 5.1, for example, will show that the share price 
of Northern Rock had fallen by a quarter during a period of four months, ending 
three months before the emergency measures had to be put in place.
24 For banks 
in Norway for example this action is triggered inside the bank itself. If the share 
price of the bank falls by more than 25% between AGMs the authorities can 
require an extraordinary meeting of shareholders to be called to discuss how the 
bank the bank might reverse the decline. (If the share price falls by 75% a second 
meeting can be required where this time the question is whether the bank should 
continue trading. The implication is that it should be closed in an orderly manner 
unless any capital injection can be obtained.) 
 
Figure 5.1  The performance of the Northern Rock share price 
      compared to those of other large mortgage lenders 






Nieto and Wall (2006) note that the enforcement of PCA depends on the accuracy 
of reported capital adequacy ratios. They survey several studies suggesting that 
                                                 
24 It is also noticeable from Figure 5.1 that HBOS, which is the only other bank to show a 
noticeable decline in share price, was showing it over a year before it ultimately had to accept a 
rapid merger with Lloyds TSB to ensure continuing confidence.  
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market signals, primarily subordinated debt spreads, provide useful information 
about banks’ financial conditions and that in some cases these signals have proven 
more accurate than the banks’ reported Basel I capital ratio. These studies (eg, 
Sironi, 2001; Evanoff and Wall, 2002; Llewellyn and Mayes, 2004) show that the 
information is sufficiently reliable for use as a failsafe mechanism to identify 
critically undercapitalized organizations. The use of such market risk measures 
would provide a valuable supplemental measure for PCA. 
  Supervisors, though have been reluctant to use market signals to determine 
the capital category of banks operating under PCA. A less controversial and 
perhaps easier approach to implement would be to use market-risk measures as 
triggers for closer supervisory scrutiny of a bank. These measures could include 
subordinated debt spreads and other measures such as the pricing of credit 
derivatives, or equity based measures, such as Moody’s KMV Expected Default 
Frequency. The measures could be used informally by individual supervisors to 
trigger closer scrutiny of the various parts of the group. The use of such market 
measures would be consistent with Pillar 2 of the new Capital Accord, which 
requires supervisory review of bank’s reported capital adequacy and with Pillar 3, 
which seeks to encourage market discipline. Market risk measures could further 
be used to trigger a mandatory meeting of the college of supervisors to review the 
group’s condition and, when appropriate, for triggering a coordinated special 
examination of the banking group. 
  However, the current crisis shows some of the limitation of market signals as 
such crises only occur when the market as a whole misprices risk. In the main 
their use is in more normal times in the relative pricing of securities. Nevertheless, 
while they may form the only signal on occasion, they are only an indicator and 
may well not pick up an impending problem or indicate incorrectly. The present 
crisis emphasises all too clearly that the nature of the shocks to which institutions 
can be exposed lies outside those commonly considered – take the case of the 
drying up of wholesale markets for example. While liquidity requirements might 
have eased the problem, the shocks lay outside the boundary of any stress tests 
organisations or their supervisors are likely to have made. 
  CEBS (2009) has just completed a major survey of the Member States 
including a mapping of their early intervention measures. It appears that there is 
wide variation in powers. Even when powers and procedures are similar in 
character there are extensive differences in the detail. Only three EU countries 
(Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) have any automatic triggers for action 
and most countries can exercise forbearance. The task for harmonisation is thus 
huge as recognised by the de Larosière Report but this survey is an input to the 
European Commission’s White Paper on Early Intervention due out in the middle 





In order for bank supervisors to use their powers effectively, they must have an 
accurate understanding of the bank’s and banking group’s financial condition. A 
potential problem for a prudential supervisor of a cross-border banking group is 
that of determining the status of those parts of the group outside its supervisory 
control. 
  The need for information sharing among the supervisors is recognized in the 
CRD, Article 132, which establishes that: 
 
  the competent authorities shall communicate on request all relevant 
information and shall communicate on their own initiative all essential 
information. […] Information shall be regarded as essential if it could 
materially influence the assessment of the financial soundness of a credit 
institution or financial institution in another Member State. In particular, 
competent authorities responsible for consolidated supervision of EU parent 
credit institutions and credit institutions controlled by EU parent financial 
holding companies shall provide the competent authorities in other Member 
States who supervise subsidiaries of these parents with all relevant 
information. In determining the extent of relevant information, the importance 
of these subsidiaries within the financial system in those Member States shall 
be taken into account. 
 
This obligation for information expands to encompass also: 
 
(c) adverse developments in credit institutions or in other entities of a group, 
which could seriously affect the credit institutions; and 
(d) major sanctions and exceptional measures taken by competent authorities in 
accordance with this Directive, including the imposition of an additional 
capital charge under Article 136 … . 
 
These provisions for information sharing have also been strengthened with the 
adoption of Pillar 3 of the new Capital Accord.
25 For example, banks are required 
to report the total and Tier 1 capital ratios for the consolidated group and for 
significant bank subsidiaries. In this case, the host supervisors of the subsidiaries 
could use this information (that would be reflected in a market indicator) as 
                                                 
25 Pillar 3 aims to encourage market discipline by developing a set of disclosure requirements 
which will allow market participants and foreign supervisors to assess relevant pieces of 
information on the scope of application, capital, risk exposures, risk assessment processes, and 
hence the capital adequacy of the institution. Since domestic supervisors typically request 
additional information from the banks it is unlikely that this public disclosure will be thought 
sufficient.  
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justification for triggering consultations with the home country supervisor and/or 
for undertaking a special examination of the banking group.
26 
  While the information sharing mandated by the CRD should provide national 
supervisors with the information they need, ad hoc sharing on a banking-group by 
banking-group basis is likely to be inefficient and leave room for gaps in 
information sharing. The enhanced sharing of information among supervisors is 
aimed at reducing the incentives of supervisors of the subsidiaries or parent bank 
to exploit the information to their advantage and it is a precondition for the 
effective implementation of PCA as a mechanism aimed at resolving the cross-
border agency problems that arise in supervising and resolving cross-border 
banking groups. Mayes (2006b) and Vesala (2005) advocate a policy of 
information sharing via the establishment of a common data base. At a minimum 
this data base should contain quarterly consolidated financial statements from all 
insured banks and their nonbank corporate parents (when one exists) that is 
available to all bank supervisors and ideally these financial statements would be 
publicly available.
27 Additionally, there would be some merit in establishing a 
data base with confidential supervisory information and analysis would also be 
available to the appropriate national supervisory agencies to assist all prudential 
supervisors in understanding the condition of the group as a whole and its 
relationship to the bank they each supervise. The European Central Bank (ECB) 
or the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) could harbour that 
database. In the case of the ECB, this responsibility would be consistent with 
article 105.5 of the EC Treaty: ‘the ESCB shall contribute to the smooth conduct 
of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential 
supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system’. This 
proposal would also require modification of the professional secrecy imposed by 
article 44 of the Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 14 June, 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of 
credit institutions (recast).
28 
  In general there is scepticism over the effectiveness of information sharing 
under the current rules. Persson (2009) suggests: 
 
                                                 
26 The required level of disclosure is both limited in its relevance and its timeliness (Mayes, 2004). 
The requirements fall well short of what has been required of banks in New Zealand since 1996, 
where disclosure statements are required quarterly to reveal peak exposures and where bank 
directors are legally liable for their accuracy. 
27 The US has long required its banks and bank holding companies to file standardized reports of 
income and condition with their federal supervisor. These reports have been made publicly 
available for well over a decade, and are currently available at no charge on the Internet from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. For example, the commercial bank files (as of June 2007) are 
available at http://www.chicagofed.org/economic_research_and_data/commercial_bank_data.cfm. 
28 L 177/ 1 OJ of 30 June, 2006.  
24 
  Information sharing amongst all authorities involved in a cross-border 
banking group is also a delicate concern. In the Nordic and Baltic countries, 
there are six banking groups with significant cross-border activities.
29 The 
regulatory contacts of these groups include seven supervisors and eight 
central banks.
30 It is consequently not far-fetched to argue that information 
sharing will be complicated and slow in such a setting. 
 
Something more immediate and swift is required using a common basis and 
without the need to considered whether it should be revealed to the rest of the 
team. 
  The de Larosière report is clearly pushing in the right direction in encouraging 
the development of supervisory colleges and in offering a mechanism through the 
enhanced CEBS (which it labels European Banking Authority) for resolving 
disputes. However, a supervisory college needs to operate as if it were a unified 
supervisor with all parts being fully informed if each contributor is both to play its 
full part in ensuring stability in the individual institution and being able to 
aggregate information across banks to ensure financial stability in the system in 





MoUs are important tools in establishing contact networks and a common 
language, which would be helpful in a crisis.
31 However, because of their lack of a 
binding legal status they are hardly sufficient for further development of the 
handling of cross-border banking. Furthermore, practical issues such as, that in the 
extreme, there may be up to 81 separate entities involved in agreeing a joint 
assessment, do not speak for the MoUs as an optimal long run solution. Instead, 
they should be considered as a first step, and later as a complement, in facilitating 
international monitoring and supervision. 
  Although PCA reduces supervisory discretion, some element of discretion is 
inevitable. While a supervisor can be compelled to employ some measures, the 
choice of what limits the risk best and reduces any impending loss is bound to be 
                                                 
29 These banks are: Nordea, SEB, Swedbank, SHB, Danske Bank and Kaupthing. The last, 
Kaupthing, has of course failed since the assessment was written and is no longer part of the 
current list. 
30 The Bank of Lithuania also has supervisory responsibility. 
31 Mayes and Vesala (2000) argue that the sharing of home/host responsibilities during the 
movement toward a single market is possible partly because of MoUs on information sharing. 
Opinions on this matter are, however, diverging and Mayes (2006a) argues for example that 
predetermined responsibility and obligations in a MoU may still cause agency problems and 
conflicts once a cross-border crisis arrives.  
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substantially case specific. For example replacing existing management, might be 
essential to restore the banks’ financial health in some cases, but 
counterproductive in other cases.
32 
  The existence of supervisory discretion raises the possibility of a supervisor 
taking or failing to take a variety of actions that are harmful to the overall banking 
group but which yield net benefits to the supervisor’s particular country. For 
example, a supervisor could impose draconian limitations on a bank that is small 
relative to its financial system, even though the bank provides valuable services to 
the rest of the group elsewhere. Alternatively, a supervisor may forbear from 
disciplining or closing a bank that has a large presence in its country. Such 
forbearance could take the form of a supervisor accepting inadequate capital 
restoration plans and imposing only the minimum disciplinary measures required 
under PCA, even though additional measures are likely to be necessary to rebuild 
the bank’s capital. The consequences could be that weakness at the group level 
that would adversely impact subsidiaries (even the banking systems) in other 
countries and may substantially raise the cost of resolving the group should it 
become insolvent. 
  In some respects the present crisis is not a good reflection of the problem 
because governments will behave differently when there is a serious threat to the 
stability of the system as a whole. In these circumstances they tend not to allow 
the normal process of problem correction to go through to its conclusion and 
intervene to keep the institution going. Where they do not, and that is a surprise, 
as in the case of Lehman Brothers, the impact on expectations is particularly 
large. On the whole however the experience in the crisis has been that what is 
defined as being of ‘systemic importance’ covers a much wider range of 
institutions than a simple arithmetic calculation of direct contagion would imply 
(De Bandt and Hartmann, 2000). In many respects it reflects an ad hoc assessment 
of indirect contagion or a view of the political fall out. 
  The EU has some mechanisms that could be extended to provide an element 
of coordination in the use of discretionary measures. The CRD provides for some 
coordination of banks supervision and allows for the delegation of some 
supervisory responsibilities to another Member State’s prudential supervisor. 
Article 131 establishes that: 
 
  in order to facilitate and establish effective supervision, the competent 
authority responsible for supervision on a consolidated basis and the other 
competent authorities shall have written coordination and cooperation 
arrangements in place. Under these arrangements additional tasks may be 
                                                 
32 As noted above, this analysis assumes the adoption of a uniform system of PCA by all EU 
countries so that the authorities in each of the EU countries would have a similar if not identical 
range of powers. Currently this is far from the case and, although the toolkit may be similar, what 
can or must be done in each circumstance varies considerably.  
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entrusted to the competent authority responsible for supervision on a 
consolidated basis and procedures for the decision making process and for 
cooperation with other competent authorities, may be specified. The 
competent authorities responsible for authorizing the subsidiary of a parent 
undertaking which is a credit institution may, by bilateral agreement, delegate 
their responsibility for supervision to the competent authorities which 
authorized and supervise the parent undertaking so that they assume 
responsibility for supervising the subsidiary in accordance with this Directive. 
 
Thus, the CRD provides for a general mechanism of coordination and cooperation 
among supervisors and it also envisages a stronger form of coordination, which is 
the possibility that the host supervisor of a subsidiary may delegate its 
responsibility to the home country prudential supervisor of the subsidiary’s 
parent. 
  The primary problem with using the authority provided by the CRD is that 
delegating supervisory responsibility to the home country supervisor of the parent 
bank is likely to worsen the principal-agent conflict between the parent’s 
supervisor as agent, and the subsidiary country’s taxpayers and voters, as 
principal. The parent’s supervisor would be responsible for the impact of its 
supervisory action on the deposit insurance fund and possibly the financial 
stability of the host country of the subsidiary, but the parent’s supervisor would 
not be directly accountable to the host country government and the taxpayers, thus 
increasing the agency problem. 
  The mechanism for coordinating discretionary PCA actions is likely to be 
through the ‘college’ of the prudential supervisors of the banks in the group and 
short of having a European level supervisor that replaces the current arrangements 
it the obvious way to proceed.
33 However, there is more than one view of what 
constitutes a ‘college’. A college would be fully compatible with Article 129 of 
the Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 
June, 2006 relating to the pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast), 
which envisages the cooperation of the consolidating supervisor with the 
competent authorities of the subsidiaries, and is the route advocated by de 
Larosière.
34 The coordination mechanisms could be merely advisory, leaving the 
final decision up to the national supervisors of each bank, or it could be binding 
upon the members. In some cases allowing each supervisor to take disciplinary 
action is likely to be acceptable, especially if the action would be unlikely to have 
adverse consequences on other group members. However, leaving the final 
decision in the hands of each bank’s national supervisor is not likely to result in 
effective coordination to the extent that different supervisors reach different 
                                                 
33 This would effectively be an extension of the role the groups of supervisors that have had to be 
set up to see through the requirements of the CRD for each individual bank. 
34 L 177/48 Official Journal of the European Union of 30 June, 2006.  
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conclusions about the appropriate actions either because they have different 
incentives or because they have reached different judgments. Thus, for an 
effective implementation of a PCA policy as a coordination mechanism between 
supervisors, a better solution would be to give the authority to take discretionary 
actions that will be binding on all prudential supervisors in the college. The idea 
behind such a grouping is that the supervisors can become in some sense jointly 
responsible for the actions the group takes. In such a case it may then be easier to 
agree to remedial actions. 
  Such a college of supervisors for each cross-border banking group should be 
formed before the need arises to invoke PCA’s disciplinary provisions. However, 
the formation of a college with authority to make discretionary decisions within 
the PCA policy framework should be mandatory as soon as a bank owned by a 
cross-border banking group falls below the capital standard or other threshold.
35 A 
problem arises if the resolution authority and the supervisory authority are not one 
and the same. In the UK for example, while the bank is performing acceptably 
under ‘normal’ conditions the FSA has full responsibility. Once problems strike 
and problems need to be resolved the Bank of England cuts in. The process, 
however, begins with ‘heightened supervision’ conducted by the FSA, where the 
problems are feared but may not actually materialize. 
  The formation of the college does not mean that decisions will always be 
made in a timely and harmonious fashion. Even the best of colleges is likely to be 
an inefficient mechanism for addressing most issues that require consultation or 
negotiation with the banking group. For example, if a cross-border banking group 
with capital below the minimum capital requirements is required to develop a 
capital restoration plan that is acceptable to its supervisors, having the bank 
negotiate the plan with each of the college members would be slow and 
inefficient. Where such consultation or negotiation is required, a better alternative 
would be for the committee to select one supervisor as the primary contact with 
the bank.
36 The role of the college would then be to review and approve the 
contact supervisor’s agreement with the bank. In both the de Larosière proposals 
and the suggestions of the FSF (Financial Stability Forum) for colleges that 
extend beyond the EU/EEA it is not clear if the role of the lead supervisor would 
extend that far. 
  For a variety of reasons, a college of supervisors may at times find reaching a 
decision difficult. One way of forcing timely action would be for PCA to establish 
a presumption that a certain action will automatically be effective say 30 days 
after a bank violates one of the PCA triggers, unless the college determines that 
taking the action will not further the purposes of PCA. Similar provision is 
                                                 
35 There is a clear complexity if responsibility for ongoing supervision and resolution (whether or 
not least cost) belong to different agencies. 
36 Ordinarily the contact would be the parent’s supervisor unless the problems are focused in 
particular subsidiaries or markets.  
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envisaged in Article 129 of the Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 14 June, 2006 relating to the pursuit of the business of credit 
institutions (recast), which foresees that the consolidating supervisor will decide 
in a time framework in the absence of a joint decision. This would prevent a 
subset of the college from using committee deliberations to stall effective action. 
Additionally, the colleges may somewhat reduce the scope for relatively 
unimportant disagreements to stall decision making by specifying in advance that 
the college will follow decision rules that give greater weight to the judgments of 
supervisors of the larger banks in the group and the supervisors from countries 
where the banking group is systemically important. de Larosière’s proposals 
would cover the EBA being able to resolve such disputes. The question is whether 
this would be able to operate effectively in the early stages of the ‘amber’ phase 
when the hope is that prompt corrective action will return the institution to green 
status rather than permit the problems to continue or worse, sink into the ‘red’ 
zone. 
  Although a college provides a mechanism for all affected countries to have a 
voice in the corrective measures’ decision taken under PCA, the college does not 
solve the agency problem caused by the mismatch between supervisory powers 
and supervisory accountability to voters. Giving each country’s supervisor a say 
in a coordinating college is not equivalent to the power that the supervisor would 
have to protect its country’s interests as it could with a purely domestic bank. 
However, the inability of supervisors in each country to have the same control as 
they would over a purely domestic group is an unavoidable consequence of 
groups operating as integrated entities in more than one Member State. Corrective 
measures taken (or left untaken) will have sometimes different consequences for 
different countries.
37 The best that can be said is that a college structure will 
typically provide better representation of each of the affected countries than 
would a system that gives all of the power to a single supervisor, hence, reducing 
the agency problem by increasing supervisor’s accountability to the government 
and the tax payer. 
  Views have changed in the EU and it is no longer the presupposition that the 
safety net can be maintained adequately even for cross-border banks while using 
the existing national institutions. The de Laroisère Report has made has made 
sweeping proposals. Unlike some previous proposals it does not contemplate 
assigning the ECB some supervisory responsibility, as is possible under the 
Treaty,
38 but it does suggest that it is necessary to create a new institution, the 
European System of Financial Supervision. (The role it assigns to the ECB is in 
                                                 
37 Giving every supervisor a veto over taking an action would not prevent problems if failure to act 
would have large adverse consequences for some country. Similarly, giving every supervisor a 
veto over failing to act would not help if taking a given action would have large adverse 
consequences for some countries. 
38 Article 127§6.  
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the field of macro-prudential risk assessment through a European Systemic Risk 
Council (ESRC) but that is beyond the ambit of this paper.) Like the earlier 
proposals for a European System of Financial Supervisors (matching the 
European System of Central Banks) advocated by Schoenmaker and Oosterloo 
(2006) and a European Organisation for Financial Supervision as suggested by 
Ingves (2006) and Persson (2008), the framework is designed to coordinate 
existing supervisors for significant cross-border banks while permitting existing 
national supervisory arrangements for the remainder. It suggests turning the three 
‘level 3’ committees, CEBS, CESR and CEIOPS into ‘Authorities’ (European 
Banking Authority, European Insurance Authority, European Securities 
Authority), which would be responsible for: 
 
•  Legally binding mediation between national supervisors 
•  Adoption of binding supervisory standards 
•  Adoption of binding technical decisions applicable to individual institutions 
•  Oversight and co-ordination of colleges of supervisors 
•  Licensing and supervision of specific EU-wide institutions (eg credit rating 
agencies and post-trading infrastructure) 
•  Binding cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Council over macro-
prudential supervision 
•  Strong coordinating role in crisis situations 
 
The Turner Report, while having a rather different approach to the detail, with 
lesser powers over national authorities, also sees the level 3 committees as lying at 
the heart of the way forward, although in his case he opts for an integrated 
authority covering all three committees on the grounds that large complex 
organizations, especially those running across borders need to be treated as a 
single entity. This body would: 
 
•  Draft detailed technical rules 
• Advise  the  Commission  on framework directives 
•  Issue non-binding guidance to national authorities on best practice in 
implementation and interpretation 
•  Oversee EU supervisory colleges and encourage the exchange of best practice 
ideas 
•  Oversee peer review 
•  Provide representation on international standards setting bodies along side 
member states 
•  Have a role in macro-prudential analysis along with the ESCB 
 
Thus neither report takes a strong stand on trying to have an EU-level of 
supervision for significant entities that run across borders, although the de  
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Larosière proposals would go a lot further forward towards harmonization of the 
tools that can be used both in supervision and in the resolution of problems. 
  What might prove rather easier would be to follow the suggestion of Čihák 
and Decressin (2007) and introduce a separate European level of supervision for 
which banks could opt if they chose to use the European Company Statute as their 
form of incorporation. As suggested by Eisenbeis and Kaufman (2007), there 
could be some financial incentive for them to adopt this, say in the form of a 
reduced deposit insurance premium as the risks involved are lower. As this regime 
would be new it could incorporate a PCA approach and the ability to close banks 
while they still had positive capital as in the US system, since this would not 
involve taking any rights away from existing shareholders. This would also make 
it easier for the authorities to decide on the acceptable structure of the banking 
group. 
  If one followed the US example more closely then in many respects it is a 
version of the FDIC, perhaps labeled a European Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(EDIC) that would be the most important institution to create. Thus colleges of 
supervisors could cover the group in normal times but as soon as any problem was 
thought imminent a single authority would take over to ensure the necessary 
speedy action. This would then provide a European level equivalent to the UK 
approach, where the FSA remains responsible in the ‘amber’ phase when an 
institution has been identified as having potential problems but the Bank of 
England is alerted and begins preparations in case the ‘red’ phase is necessary and 
the authorities need to step in to organize a resolution. 
  One of the major objections raised to EU-level organizations having an 
operational role is that they do not have access to any ‘federal’ funds. They would 
have to rely on deposit insurers and other national instruments. Countries are 
unwilling to subscribe in advance to participating in bail outs or other resolution 
costs for a number of reasons: first because of the moral hazard it might impose 
on other authorities seeking to shift the cost, and second because the willingness 
to bail out depends on countries’ views of who was responsible for the problem in 
the first place. Reluctance on the part of the UK and the Netherlands to 
compensate depositors in the branches of Icelandic banks stemmed in part from 
the fact that it was the Icelandic insurer who was responsible under EU law but 
second that the Icelandic supervisor had been quite happy to see the rapid growth 
of these deposits, in the full knowledge that the insurance fund would not be able 






Probably the most important element of being able to act rapidly and avoid getting 
into a serious crisis is being fully prepared beforehand. With large and complex 
financial institutions running across borders this is no mean task, although not 
necessarily a particularly costly one. The FDIC has realized that its existing 
powers and provisions are insufficient and has set out proposals as to how it 
should proceed (FDIC, 2008). The primary ingredient is that it needs extensive 
understanding of the bank’s computer systems and the detailed structure of its 
deposits, so if something went wrong it could act rapidly, either to transfer the 
insured deposits to a bridge bank or to another institution. 
  If depositors are to remain assured that they will not suffer a material break in 
their access to their funds the practical ability of the authorities to ensure this must 
be obvious. In most European countries on the other hand the practical 
implication is that no such assurance can be made, therefore, if a bank gets in 
difficulty it will be rational for there to be a run and the authorities will be 
precipitated into drastic action such as a blanket guarantee, as observed with 
Northern Rock, thereby destroying the ability of the safety net to head off severe 
problems. While it is normally problems with wholesale financing that will 
project banks into the arms of the authorities, because those lenders are better 
informed, it is usually a retail run that will end the viability of the bank. 
Wholesale failures or ‘silent runs’ as Kane (2008) describes them can usually be 
countered by emergency collateralized lending by the central bank on previously 
laid down terms (at a margin over the market rate and with haircuts sufficient to 
avoid loss).
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  However, such prepositioning needs to be much more extensive than simply 
being able to organize deposit insurance. Labrosse and Walker (2007) point out 
that the deposit insurer itself needs to be carefully structured to ensure that it can 
cope with a rapid resolution. This not only entails a range of procedures that need 
to be in place but also access to funding, appropriate skilled staff and access to 
specialist advice. (Handling a problem bank not only requires a senior commercial 
banker with experience in turn rounds as CEO but a well connected merchant 
banker to organize the resale to the private sector.) In many countries even if 
insolvency is followed there is a lack of skilled receivers to organize a rapid 
solution and initial payout to creditors (Choi and Kim, 2007). 
  The most comprehensive version of prepositioning in place is probably that of 
New Zealand. Here the onus is primarily on the bank itself. Earthquakes are quite 
                                                 
39 Highly leveraged institutions will be less able to withstand the silent run and we can therefore 
expect in the light of this experience that supervisors will increase the capital requirements for 
such leveraged institutions and will in particular focus on liquidity and the coverage ratio in the 
fairly short run.  
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common in New Zealand and most of the main banks (and the central bank) have 
their headquarters on or near the fault line in the capital Wellington. It is therefore 
essential that they have in place extensive plans to keep operating in the event of a 
disaster (the core of the financial system can be recreated and opened again within 
a day in Australia, for example, if needed). However, this approach has been 
extended explicitly to banks, because all the main banks are foreign (Australian) 
owned
40 and is thus highly relevant for cross-border concerns in Europe. These 
banks first of all have to be locally incorporated, and be capable of being free-
standing within the value day (RBNZ, 2006). 
  As thing stands in Europe there is no requirement that banks operating in host 
countries have any self-sustainable structure whether they are locally incorporated 
subsidiaries or just branches. Indeed the logic of European integration suggests 
that they should not be free-standing so that the group can reap the efficiencies of 
economies of scale, pooling reserves etc. While initially cross-border 
arrangements may have taken the form of a holding company with separately 
operating subsidiaries in other countries this becoming increasing less the pattern. 
  This idea of being free-standing (labeled ‘outsourcing’ policy) means that the 
bank can keep vital functions going in the event of the failure of any of its 
important suppliers and counterparties. This includes the parent. Thus if the 
Australian parent were to fail the New Zealand authorities need to be able to step 
in to the New Zealand subsidiary, ring fence and ensure that it is adequately 
capitalized in a manner that it can continue operating without any loss of 
confidence (or indeed down rating). Doing this requires considerable 
prepositioning, as the statutory manager, appointed by the courts on the advice of 
the supervisor, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ), has to be able to 
identify the claims on the bank, value them sufficiently accurately that they can be 
written down and the bank reopen without any material break. This requires 
substantial prior information. Normally in the event of bank failure it is not a 
complete surprise and there would be some time to activate the systems and 
cooperation with the Reserve Bank before the drastic need for action arose. In the 
event of an earthquake or similar natural disaster there is likely to be no warning 
at all, so the recovery systems have to be able to operate immediately and rapidly. 
  Since Europe is not so exposed to natural disasters such prepositioning is not 
normal practice but the Roskilde case shows the advantages of being able to act in 
that way. It would not have been possible to transfer the insured deposits or 
payout the insured depositors in such a way that they would not have had a 
material break in their funds without keeping the core of the organization going. 
There was no way in which the deposits could be divided up into the insured and 
the uninsured immediately so the division of the bank into the old failed shell and 
                                                 
40 Until recently the only New Zealand owned bank was the Taranaki Savings Bank with about 1% 
of the market but the government has established Kiwi Bank, which is a narrow bank operated 
from post offices, and this has been very successful and is rapidly gaining market share.  
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the new surviving bank meant that the division had to be crude, with a write down 
of the junior creditors, a write off of the shareholders and the rest of the bank 
continuing in existing premises. In some countries such as the UK the ability to 
make such a rapid division was even less plausible as deposit insurance was a net 
concept. A borrower from the bank has his deposit offset against the loan before 
any payout is attempted. Such complex arrangements would make very rapid 
solutions almost impossible – there are limits as to how far prepositioning can go. 
  In March 2009 the UK experienced the failure of the Dunfermline Building 
Society. While not a full bank, it was a depository institution and operating in a 
relatively narrow range of products. Under the new Special Resolution Regime, 
Dunfermline could be readily resolved with the deposits, retail mortgage book and 
branches being taken over by the country’s largest building society, Nationwide, 
and the remaining viable business being placed in a bridge bank for rapid sale to 
the private sector all the residual being left in the receivership. This has been 
financed by a combination of the deposit insurer and the government (taxpayer), 
although the government hopes that the sale of the bridge bank will cover its 
temporary injection. The question that needs to be asked here is could the same 
process have been applied if this had been a cross-border institution? The first 
stage of PCA clearly failed. Dunfermline was not dissuaded by the authorities 
from rapidly increasing exposure to the commercial sector when the market was 
already looking thin nor from buying increasingly troubled derivatives from US 
vendors (including Lehman Brothers). Clearly such a record could be emulated at 
the European level. In the same way the authorities could not find a third party 
willing to take on the whole risk and purchase the institution before it failed. 
(Since Dunfermline was a mutual, approaching the shareholders – the depositors – 
was not a viable proposition.) 
 
 
9 Concluding  remarks 
PCA was designed to improve the prudential supervision of banks in the US, most 
of which operate in a single market. An EU version of PCA could also improve 
the prudential supervision of banks operating in more than one Member State. 
However, to be as effective as possible, the EU version should address a number 
of cross-border issues that are incompatible with the existing decentralized 
structure of the EU safety net and indeed with that proposed in the de Larosière 
Report. 
  The proposal made here facilitates the resolution of conflicts among 
supervisors of different countries so that the cost of reconciling the conflicts is 
less than the cost of going it alone. In this respect, PCA is a critical element of the 
proposal.  
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  Bank supervisors need to understand the overall financial condition of a 
banking group and its various individual banks if they are to effectively anticipate 
problems and take appropriate corrective measures. The effectiveness of PCA as a 
mechanism to reduce agency problems among supervisors would rely on the 
availability of information to prudential supervisors as well as supervisor's use of 
market information. Availability could be improved by reducing information 
asymmetries among supervisors on individual bank's financial condition. The use 
of market based risk measures could be mandated in the supervisory process. At a 
minimum, this would include requiring additional examinations of banking groups 
whose reported capital exceeds minimum required levels but which are identified 
as high risk by financial markets and mandating that the relevant banking 
supervisors meet to share their evaluations of the group. 
  PCA reduces supervisors’ ability to exercise forbearance, but it by no means 
eliminates supervisory discretion. Supervisors retain substantial discretion in their 
implementation of PCA so long as a bank’s regulatory capital exceeds the critical 
level at which it is forced into resolution. If the consequences of bank supervision 
in one country can have large consequences for the group’s banks in other 
countries, then deciding how best to exercise this discretion should be decided by 
the supervisors of all the banks (or at least all of the significant banks) in a 
collegial format. However, even if a satisfactory means of deciding what to do can 
be implemented, the actual powers of supervisors in the EU are not identical. 
Some may not be able to implement the actions others wish to vote for. Hence, 
effective implementation would require as a precondition that prudential 
supervisors be given the same and comprehensive authority to take the corrective 
measures in PCA (Nieto and Wall, 2006). 
  The recent financial instability makes it clear that a European version of PCA 
would need to incorporate new triggers for early intervention relating to risk 
assessment and market information in addition to those on capital adequacy if 
intervention is to start early enough. The rapidity with which problems have 
emerged suggests that the time constraints under which PCA operates would need 
to be shorter. 
  Furthermore for PCA to operate in a complex cross-border institution, there 
would need to be considerable prepositioning by the supervisory/resolution 
authority to ensure that claims, especially insured deposits, could be identified 
rapidly so that the resolution procedures are credible and depositors do not expect 
there to be any material break in access to their funds. 
  All this could be achieved within existing supervisory and resolution 
structures, especially as enhanced by the de Larosière proposals, although some 
changes will be necessary in some countries to ensure that banks can be 
reorganized before they run out of capital. However, US experience suggests that 
in due course it will be found necessary to have a Europe level institution. There 
is probably a greater need to have a European resolution agency that a European  
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supervisor but if a new single regime for cross-border banks were implemented, 
as suggested by Čihák and Decressin (2007) for example this might provide an 
easier solution than inter-agency cooperation. There is a strong understandable 
dislike of making ex ante commitments to burden sharing. And if problems can be 
addressed early and acted upon rapidly then there may be little burden to share 
even if the institution actually fails. Nevertheless when there is a need for action, 
having a single unified agency greatly eases the task. In the US such an agency is 
involved with supervision but in the new arrangements in the UK it is not. It is too 
soon to say whether the new arrangements will lead to the FSA acting early 
enough and whether the parties most likely to be able to organize an (un)assisted 
private sector rescue are able to participate in time. Nevertheless looking to the 
relatively loose coordination among national supervisors sounds relative less 
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